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17.1  Introduction 
Since it was first recognized in August  1982, the international debt 
crisis has dominated economic policymaking in the developing coun- 
tries, economic relations between the debtor and creditor countries, 
the attention of the multilateral  institutions in their dealings with the 
debtor nations, and private-sector  decisions on lending to the devel- 
oping countries. 
The economic difficulties of the debtors since 1982 are summarized 
by two facts: Per capita incomes in the Baker fifteen of heavily indebted 
countries fell on average 10 percent over the period  1981 to 1984 and 
have risen very little since; and domestic investment has fallen by an 
extraordinary 5 percent of GNP, significantly  impairing growth prospects. 
The most remarkable feature of the debt strategy followed since 1982 
is that the heavily indebted developing countries have been transferring 
real resources of close to 5 percent of their income to the developed 
creditor countries. A solution of the debt crisis will either reverse the 
direction of this resource flow or at least significantly reduce it. Despite 
the virtual cessation of capital inflows, debt burden indicators, such 
as the debt-to-export ratio, have  not  improved.  The picture for the 
debtors is not entirely bleak. Real interest rates fell between 1982 and 
1987, though they appear late in  1987 to be rising again. Net exports 
showed extraordinary growth. Budget deficits have been reduced de- 
spite falling incomes. In 1987 commodity prices have begun to recover. 
The period has seen a shift toward rather than away from democracy. 
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There has also been very real progress for the creditor banks and 
for the international financial system. Most important, neither the com- 
mercial nor central banks have had to deal with  large-scale debt de- 
faults. Balance sheets of creditor banks have been strengthened. There 
is an active secondary market in developing country debt, and debt- 
to-equity swaps are a reality. 
But the fact remains that five years after it began, the debt crisis is 
very much  alive.  None  of  the major  Latin American  countries has 
restored normal  access to the international  capital markets. Even a 
country like Colombia, which has rigorously  met its payments, finds 
it difficult to roll over its debts. At least one major debtor has been in 
trouble each year. In 1987 it is Brazil, whose moratorium could mark 
the beginning of a new phase of the crisis. 
In its brief life the international debt crisis has generated an impres- 
sive variety of proposed initiatives and  solutions.’  Least radical  are 
proposals for procedural reform and changes in the nature of the claims 
on the existing debt. There have been several suggestions for the cre- 
ation of a facility, or new institution that would in specified ways deal 
with the overhang of existing debt. And finally, there are proposals for 
debt relief. I take up these possibilities in turn in sections 17.3 through 
17.5. 
17.2  Preliminaries 
The debt crisis involves at least three parties: the debtor countries, 
the creditor countries, and the private banks and their stockholders. 
A more sophisticated view further distinguishes between the govern- 
ments of  debtor and  creditor countries and their citizens, between 
workers in the debtor countries and portfolio holders who succeeded 
in moving their capital abroad, and between financial and manufactur- 
ing interests in the developed countries. 
Although the point is rarely explicitly recognized, alternative solu- 
tions  to the debt crisis imply  different burdens for different groups 
involved in the crisis. Up to 1987, most of the burden has been borne 
by wage earners in the debtor countries. Part has been borne by bank 
stockholders, who have seen the value of their shares rise less rapidly 
than the stock market as a whole. Some will be borne by the taxpayers 
of the creditor countries, as the banks record portfolio losses, lower 
profits, and lower taxes. 
Before describing and evaluating plans to solve the debt problem, I 
make  several stipulations  about the nature  of  the  problem  and  its 
solution. 
1. The debt crisis will have to be resolved in a way that differentiates 
among countries. Bolivia’s problem is different from Brazil’s, and 







From the viewpoint of the stability of the U.S. banking system, 
the debt problem is dominated by just a few countries. The con- 
centration on the Baker fifteen with its heavily Latin American 
flavor is a result of those countries’ debts being predominantly to 
the private sector. 
Concentration on the Baker fifteen overlooks the debt and growth 
problems of sub-Saharan Africa, which will have to be taken into 
account in any discussion of aid. 
Just as the debt problem amved unexpectedly as a result of changes 
in  the international  economy, it could  quietly go away. Higher 
prices for commodity exports, and further reductions in real in- 
terest rates, would make the entire problem look manageable. It 
could  also intensify quickly  if  the international  trading  system 
seizes up  as a  result  of  growing  protectionism  or a worldwide 
recession. 
The interested parties, the banks and the debtors, each have little 
interest in  revealing the dimensions  of  whatever compromises 
they might ultimately be willing to make. 
Finally, there are important political constraints on solutions to 
the debt problem.  There is no well-defined  economic sense in 
which  a Brazil,  Mexico,  or Argentina  is incapable  of servicing 
and ultimately paying off its debt.* However the new democratic 
governments in several of the heavily indebted countries are cer- 
tainly too weak to achieve massive reductions in consumption. 
The question for both  their own governments and the creditor 
governments is how far it is possible and politically wise to push 
their citizens to meet debt payments. 
Procedural Reform and New-Debt Instruments 
Some debt plans  would  leave the present value  of claims  on the 
debtors unchanged while changing their form. Others would reduce the 
present value of claims on the debtors. In this section I take up both 
procedural  and regulatory reforms, and suggestions for new debt in- 
struments. In neither case are the changes designed to reduce the value 
of claims on the debtors. 
17.3.1  Procedural Reform 
Several procedural reforms are listed in table 17.1. There has already 
been progress in  the implementation  of a number of these reforms, 
including the first, for instance in multiyear reschedulings for Argen- 
tina, Mexico, and the Philippines. Because macroeconomic manage- 
ment skills are in short supply, reduction of the frequency of negotiations 
would help improve the overall quality of macroeconomic management 
in  the debtor countries. The creditor banks can retain  some of  the 316  Stanley Fischer 
Table 17.1  Procedural Reforms 






Multiyear rescheduling  Banks and debtors 
Reduced size of banking syndicates and  Banks and debtors 
exit option for small banks 
Change accounting rules to allow partial 
writedowns and their gradual amortization 
U.S. information provision on foreign 
accounts 
U.S. taxation of foreign accounts 
Bank examiners and accounting 
standards 
Bank regulators and IRS 
Congress 
control afforded by frequent renegotiation  by  using  IMF Article  IV 
consultations as a framework for monitoring and conditionality. 
The size of  the banking syndicates involved in the debt negotiations 
are obstacles both to efficient negotiation and to the rapid mobilization 
of capital after an agreement has been reached. The desire of many of 
the small banks to leave the international debt business is well known. 
The exit vehicle may be either the interbank secondary markets or, as 
intended in the 1987 Argentine restructuring, exit bond issues. 
Two aspects of the accounting and tax treatment of  sales of debt at 
less than face value have to be distinguished.  First, it is sometimes 
stated that a bank selling part of its claims on a given country for less 
than book value  has to write  down its remaining claims.  However, 
some bankers believe that is not necessary, provided a good case can 
be made  that the  bank  is  likely  to collect  on the remaining  debt.3 
Certainly the creation of loss reserves against developing country debt 
has  not  forced the banks to  carry the corresponding debt on their 
balance sheets at its market value. 
Second, any bank taking a loss in a given period has to record that 
as a loss in current revenue and cannot amortize it over time. If banks 
are convinced that amortization is preferable to a larger one-time loss, 
even though there is no good economic reason they should be, they 
could be allowed to write off the losses over a period of several years 
rather than immediately. 
Although some capital flight can be regarded as a natural attempt by 
portfolio-holders  in developing countries to diversify internationally, 
much of it is a form of tax evasion. Procedural reforms 4 and 5 would 
help the debtors deal with the tax-evasion aspects of capital flight. U.S. 
and foreign developed country banks that hold the accounts of citizens 
of other countries could be required  to inform the tax authorities of 
those countries of the existence of the accounts. 317  Resolving the International Debt Crisis 
Developed countries could instead impose a uniform tax on all in- 
terest on bank accounts, and indeed on other income generated from 
securities  holdings,  that are not  those of their own taxpayers. This 
would reduce the attraction of capital flight. An alternative would be 
for the taxes to be imposed by the country from which the capital fled, 
for which purpose the provision of better information about foreign- 
held bank accounts would assist the tax authorities in the debtor coun- 
tries.  To  be effective,  all these changes would  require  international 
agreement. 
17.3.2  Changing the Nature of Claims 
A driving force behind proposals to change the nature of claims on 
the debtors is the conclusion that the structure of the debt in 1982 was 
partly  responsible  for the debt crisis.  With  a high  proportion of all 
payment flows linked to short-term interest rates abroad, the debtors 
were vulnerable to a rise in real interest rates in the developed coun- 
tries, and had no protection against changes in the terms of trade. The 
suggestions are probably  motivated also by the view  that eventually 
the structure of debtor country liabilities should correspond more closely 
to the structure of underlying assets, with more long-term fixed interest 
debt, more equity, more direct investment, and less floating rate debt.4 
Table 17.2 describes the proposals for changes in the form of claims 
on the debtors. In this summary, I focus on the more important pro- 
posals listed in the table. 
Secondary and Insurance Markets 
Secondary markets have already developed to some extent. They do 
little to solve the debt crisis other than to enable the banks-if  they 
were  to sell their claims-to  reduce their  vulnerability  to default in 
particular countries. The secondary markets could eventually become 
the locus in which an international facility deals with the debt. And, if 
the market became deeper, prices in them could serve as the basis for 
debt renegotiation. 
Private insurance of the debt is not in principle different from the 
provision of a secondary market, except that it would  enable banks 
tied into the debt to reduce their vulnerability  to default. Insurance 
rates could be deduced from the discounts on debt in the secondary 
market, and would be extremely high for many countries. It is therefore 
difficult to see private insurance markets becoming large or significant. 
There have also been  proposals  for public  sector provision of in- 
surance or guarantees, perhaps through an agency associated with the 
World Bank.5  Such an agency could help mobilize new private capital, 
perhaps  at lower  cost  than  through  private  insurance because the 
World Bank and other multilateral  agencies have developed expertise 318  Stanley Fischer 
Table 17.2  Changing the Nature of Claims 











Development of secondary and 
insurance markets 
Indexed loans 
Contingent lending obligations 
Longer debt maturities 
Debt-equity swaps 
Servicing of debt in local currency 




Creditor financial institutions and 
official institutions 
Debtors and banks 
Debtors, banks, and offical lenders 
Debtors and banks 
Debtors and banks 
Debtors and banks 
Creditor and debtor governments, and 
banks 
Debtors and creditor financial 
intermediaries 
Debtors, existing and new lenders 
Debtors and banks, plus creditor 
governments 
in  evaluating  loans to developing  countries. The agency  need  not 
necessarily  subsidize  insurance rates. To  prevent the moral  hazard 
problem of inadequate monitoring of loans by lenders that contributed 
to the creation of the current debt crisis, the agency would probably 
insist on significant co-insurance by the lenders. 
Indexed Loans 
Any loan that ties payments from debtors to creditors to some ob- 
jective criterion  is an indexed  loan. Payments may  be fixed  in  real 
rather than nominal terms, or may be specified as some percentage of 
GNP. Exchange participation notes suggested by Bailey (1983) tie pay- 
ments to export earnings.6 In well-operating markets such claims could 
be priced and traded, and there is no difficulty in principle in envisaging 
their introduction. 
Direct swaps of debt for claims on commodities which the recipient 
exports are another form of indexed instrument. By tying the payoff 
of loans to a specific amount of the country’s production, such agree- 
ments reduce the transfer problem. 
Debt-Equity Swaps 
Debt-equity swaps are the central element of  most market-oriented 
debt restructurings, and they have also been implemented, for example 
in Mexico, Chile, and Argentina. The essential transaction is simply 
that a debt claim on a country is  swapped by that country’s central 
bank for local currency claims that should be invested in local firms. 319  Resolving the International Debt Crisis 
The greatest attraction for the creditors is that debt-equity swaps 
often carry an implicit subsidy of the equity investment. Swaps may 
involve the purchase of debt in the secondary market at a discount, 
and redemption at face value. However there is no reason, if the debtors 
decide to subsidize, that they need to do so on the basis of the New 
York price. Another approach has been used by Chile, which auctions 
off the right to exchange dollar debt for peso assets. 
Obviously, debt-equity swaps replace interest payments by dividend 
payments, and are not a source of new money for the debtor country. 
In addition, they may merely be subsidies for investment flows that 
would have taken place anyway, and they may lead to round-tripping. 
None  of  these problems  rules  out debt-equity  swaps as a  useful 
supplement to handling the debt crisis. The present value of the divi- 
dend outflow is probably similar to the expected present value of in- 
terest outflows on the debt, but it does reduce the probability of debt 
default and  does provide  a payment stream that better matches the 
country’s economic performance. 
Local Currency Servicing 
Closely related to the notion of debt-equity  swaps is the proposal 
from debtors that they be permitted to service their debt in local cur- 
rency, with automatic reinvestment of  the proceeds in the domestic 
economy. Part of the servicing might be made available to the govern- 
ment; the remainder  would  be relent to the private  sector, in forms 
chosen by the creditors. 
This proposal has the benefit for the debtors of reducing the need to 
generate foreign currency to service the debt, though it does not reduce 
the need to mobilize resources to service the debt. It has the advantage 
for creditors that their debt is serviced in full, but  the disadvantage 
that they would be constrained from reducing their total exposure in 
any given country. In addition, it establishes a simple formula by which 
all existing creditors provide continuing finance for a country. 
Flight Capital 
It would be difficult to place flight capital as the centerpiece of any 
debt strategy. If it would come back for reasonable interest rates and 
small subsidization of debt-equity deals, it would not need any special 
attention. It is quite likely though that especially high rates of return 
would be needed, because the owners of flight capital would fear the 
imposition of ex post sanctions of some type. 
Interest Capitalization 
The last item in table 17.2, interest capitalization, could change re- 
source transfers to the debtors  quite radically and rapidly. capitalization 320  Stanley Fischer 
simply limits the amount of  interest that has to be paid  in  any one 
year, perhaps to a given nominal interest rate on the debt, or to a given 
percentage of GNP, a given percentage of export earnings, or by some 
formula related to commodity prices. The remainder is capitalized and 
automatically  added  to  the  debt,  to  be  paid  off  over  a  specified 
horizon. 
The  obvious fear from  the  viewpoint of  the  creditors is  that  the 
amounts capitalized will grow too fast for the country ever to be able 
to pay all the interest without further capitalization. Whether that is a 
realistic fear depends entirely on the prospects of the country and the 
exact formula used for capitalization. But if every reasonable capital- 
ization formula results in debt instability, then there is no chance that 
current claims on the country can be collected in full. 
Interest capitalization has received more support in Europe than in 
the United States. U.S. regulators would have to change rules if cap- 
italization were to become a practical option. 
Most of the proposals discussed  in this section are for changes in 
the form of the debt that-except  to some extent in the discussion of 
debt-equity swaps-do not reduce the present value of debtor country 
obligations. Alternative  proposals typically include elements of  debt 
relief. 
17.4  New  Institutions 
The overhang of the existing debt is the main obstacle to a renewal 
of resource inflows to the heavily indebted developing countries. Very 
early in the debt crisis both Kenen (1983) and Rohatyn (1983) proposed 
the formation of an international institution to buy debt at a price below 
the face value and provide relief to the debtor countries. The proposal 
has been developed by  Weinert (1986-87) among others. 
Kenen’s 1983 proposal was for the governments of the creditor na- 
tions to set up an International Debt Discount Corporation (IDDC) to 
which they would contribute capital. The IDDC would issue long-term 
bonds to the banks in exchange for their developing country debts, at 
a discount on face value.  If  the IDDC misjudged and was unable to 
collect, the creditor governments would bear the losses. 
The plan is elegantly simple in replacing developing country debt in 
banks’ balance sheets with the liabilities of the IDDC, in effect requiring 
the banks to lend to the IDDC. The key questions about each such 
plan are how large a write-down the banks take, whether they would 
be willing, or could be made willing, to do so, and how much relief is 
provided to the debtors. 
Any IDDC-type scheme creates a free-rider problem. If the IDDC 
buys up much of the developing country debt and makes some form 321  Resolving the International  Debt Crisis 
of debt relief possible, then the credit standing of the debtors improves. 
Those creditors who stayed out of the IDDC agreement have a capital 
gain.  For that reason an IDDC would  have  to find  some means of 
ensuring almost complete participation by the creditors. 
The IDDC notion is at the least interesting; if  it could be carried off 
with relatively small injections of public money it would also be im- 
portant. If there is to be an overall solution to the debt problem it will 
almost certainly involve an IDDC-type institution. But since the pro- 
cedures it set up for pricing debt will determine the burdens borne by 
both banks and debtors, and  the possible  extent of  creditor nation 
government support, its operating rules and management are bound to 
be the subject of protracted negotiations. It might be possible in such 
a negotiation to separate technical discussions on the terms and meth- 
ods of buying debt from aid discussions that determine the concessions 
that are given to each country. 
17.5  Debt Relief 
The case for debt relief  is that debtor countries will  be unable to 
grow unless they can increase imports, that no solution currently in 
sight permits them to do that without reducing income levels to polit- 
ically unacceptable levels, and that ultimately they will in any case not 
pay most of their debts. 
The case against debt relief is that of precedent, and the view that 
contracts that were voluntarily entered into should not be abrogated. 
The question of the precedent that would be set by giving debt relief 
is not simple: Debt contracts involve both creditors and debtors, and 
the use of  political authority to enforce the debts sets a precedent for 
creditors, whose incentives to exercise appropriate caution in lending 
are reduced. 
Relief  can come through  direct negotiations  between the creditor 
banks and each debtor country, or with the intervention of the inter- 
national institutions and/or creditor governments. Or it may be imposed 
unilaterally  by some of the debtor governments, either in the form of 
a moratorium  which  does not  repudiate  the debt, or in  the form of 
unilateral action that leaves them to deal with the legal consequences 
of their actions. Or it could come in some combination of the above. 
It might be possible for the major debtors to settle their own debt 
problems in direct negotiations. So long as the creditor countries per- 
mitted these negotiations to proceed without interference, and at crit- 
ical  stages  were willing  to help-for  instance by  changing  banking 
regulations-agreement  is quite possible. The agreement would likely 
be conditional on the country’s economic policies, and could involve 
the international institutions in monitoring roles. 322  Stanley Fischer 
17.6  Scenarios 
Three basic scenarios present themselves. The first is an evolution 
of the muddling through  strategy that has been followed to date. Its 
benefits and costs were described in the introduction. 
The second scenario would see a series of direct agreements between 
each debtor and its creditors, involving relief and substantial length- 
ening  of  the debt. The negotiations  for such  agreements would  be 
protracted and possibly crisis-laden, and would likely involve the in- 
ternational institutions in monitoring roles. 
The third possibility  is the setting up of a large international orga- 
nization,  the IDDC, to attempt to dispose of the debt problem.  This 
too has the benefits of settling the crisis and enabling economic man- 
agement teams to concentrate on policies for growth. It would  also 
provide a longer-term solution for the banks. 
Of course, the scenarios are not mutually exclusive. The second and 
third possibilities  could be combined, with the debt crisis eventually 
being resolved through a mixture of direct agreements between cred- 
itors and debtors with extra relief being provided for the most impov- 
erished  countries  though  an  IDDC  or  the  existing  international 
institutions.  Elements of the first scenario would be seen in  the evo- 
lution of international lending in the direction of more equity-like claims. 
In all cases the solutions would involve agreed-upon policy reforms 
in the debtor countries to attempt to ensure that the debt problem does 
not soon recur. 
Notes 
I. Dornbusch (1987), Feldstein et al. (1987), and Krugman (1986) present 
useful surveys of alternative solutions; the classification of debt initiatives used 
here is taken from Krugman. 
2. See Feldstein (1986) for a detailed scenario. 
3. This was the position taken by a panel of the American Institute of CPA’s 
in  1985 (see “The Outlook” column, Wall Street Journal, 26 October 1986). 
4. Lessard and Williamson (1985) provide a very useful review of alternative 
proposals for changing the form of finance of  the debtor countries. See also 
World  Bank (1985) and IMF (1986). 
5. National export credit agencies perform some of the same functions. The 
World  Bank has provided some investment guarantees in the co-financing of 
projects with commercial lenders. 
6. Lessard and Williamson (1985) analyze this and related proposals which 
they call “quasi-equity”  investments. 323  Resolving the International Debt Crisis 
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